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Progressive aspect has traditionally been linked to 
notions of speaker viewpoint on conceptual structure -
specifically, whether the speaker perceives an event as 
bounded or unbounded. The following research examines the 
cognitive structures of the mental representation that might 
underlay these conceptual notions, recasting viewpoint in 
cognitive terms. A cognitive model of information processing 
is presented, explaining processes of information parsing, 
message formulation and linguistic encoding as carried out by 
a functional grammar. In particular, we examine how the 
grammar uses the habituated or dishabituated states of neural 
models formed from sensory or memorial inputs in determining 
progressive or non-progressive message encoding. Hypotheses 
are tested by experiments based upon a paradigm in which 
speakers describe visual stimuli while simultaneously 
watching them on a screen. This online paradigm allows us to 
approximate the speaker's mental representation, providing 
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CHAPTER I 
MOVING TOWARDS A COGNITIVE DEFINITION OF 
PROGRESSIVE ASPECT 
1 
The following paper examines the distinction between 
progressive and non-progressive forms of the verb in English 
clauses. Classically, the clause has been viewed as the 
articulation of a speaker's basic conceptual structure at a 
given time. The use or non-use of progressive aspect has been 
linked to notions of speaker viewpoint on that conceptual 
structure - specifically, whether the speaker perceives an 
event as bounded or unbounded ( Chafe, 1971; Comrie, 197 6; 
Holt, 1943) . The trend in recent linguistic research has 
been to provide cognitive explanations of the clause and its 
related phenomena. This is accomplished by appealing, not 
only to conceptual notions, but to the cognitive structures 
of the mental representation that give rise to the conceptual 
notions. The idea of "speaker viewpoint" provides a semantic­
conceptual definition of progressive aspect. The ever­
expanding bridge between linguistics and psychology provides 
the linguist with much greater access to the possible 
cognitive motivations behind linguistic form. The objective 
of this paper is to recast viewpoint in terms of a more 
2 
specific cognitive definition that explains when the 
progressive is used and why it has the form that it does in 
English (copular auxiliary+ present participle) . 
Specifically, my goal is to demonstrate that the habituated 
or dishabituated states of neural models formed from sensory 
or memorial inputs provide a means for formalizing a concrete 
definition of aspect. This definition provides predictions 
that can be tested experimentally. The latter half of this 
paper provides empirical data from different types of 
analyses to support the definition. The experiments use the 
manipulation of visual stimuli on a computer screen to 
influence the construction of mental representations. These 
representations will be the basis for linguistic utterances 
using progressive or non-progressive forms. By understanding 
how the mental representation is built from the stimuli, we 
can better understand the relationship between mental 
representation and linguistic utterance. 
Questions persistently arose while examining the data in 
Table 1. These questions formed the impetus of the following 
research. 
TABLE 1. On-line Production of Subjects A and B While 
Watching "The Chicken Story" 
Subject A 
I see a man in a field with 
trees. 
He has tools 
laying them against a tree 
and one fell down 
and he picked it up. 
Put it against a tree 
again, 
and bent over. 
And picked up -­
picking --
he's picking up the wood 
and carrying the axe, to 
another location, 
where there's a pile of, 
wood. 
He's pick-
he's picking up the wood 
and chopping it against 
another piece of wood, 
and placing those pieces in 
a pile next to him. 
He's chopping another 
piece. 
And continuing laying it 
laying them next to him. 
He 's stopping 
and turning around, 
and sees a woman 
walking towards him. 
And they're talking to each 
other. 
Total Number of clauses = 
22 
Subject B 
The man walks in with 
shovels and a hoe 
leans them up against a 
tree. 
They fall, 
He picks them back up. 
He straightens things 
against the tree. 
And picks up the hatchet. 
and walks over to the 
woodpile. 
Pulls out some wood, 
and starts chopping at it 
He chops at the wood 
and s--tosses it aside 
as he's done ... 
He turns around, 
to see a woman 
coming --coming to near 
him, to him. 
She speaks, to him. 
He answers, 
apparently showing what 
he's done. 
Total Number of clauses = 
18 
3 
No. of present progressives 
= 12 
No. of present progressives 
= 1 
No. of simple present = 3 No. of simple present = 13 
4 
This data was taken from two different subjects who described 
the same film while watching it. As one can see, the subjects 
parsed the visual information in different ways, subject A 
using more clauses than subject B, with a substantial number 
of those clauses being progressive for A, but not for B. The 
questions that arise include: i. How does the speaker parse 
the incoming information in the first place? ii. How is this 
parsed information represented? iii. What relationship exists 
between the parsed information (the mental representation) 
and the clause? and iv. What relationship exists between the 
parsed information and the aspectual form of the verb? The 
answers to the first and second questions will provide the 
general theoretical framework by which the third and fourth 
questions can be answered. 
1.1 The Need for a Cognitive Information 
Processing Model 
The above questions appeal for an information processing 
model based on cognitive principles. Already, various 
researchers have taken broad cognitive approaches in 
explaining how clauses are formed, answering Osgood's (1971) 
question "Where do sentences come from?". Chafe (1977) 
discusses the subchunking of information - breaking down 
information using a schema as a guide. Eventually the chunks 
of information are propositionalized and articulated. Croft 
5 
(1991) refers to causal chains as a basic unit for clause 
structure. Clauses encode the underlying relationships 
between cause and changes of state. Osgood and Bock (1977) 
describe clauses as articulations of underlying tripartite 
cognitions made up of two entities (coded as subject and 
object) and the stative or active relationship between them 
(later encoded as the verb phrase) . Miller and Johnson-Laird 
(1976) describe clauses as articulations of events and 
events are the types of changes that speakers talk about. Van 
Voorst (1988) states that clauses are verbal representations 
of events. Events are defined by objects in space-time that 
initiate and terminate the event. Fillmore (1968) looks at 
clauses as expressions of relationship between various 
thematic roles. Common to all of these approaches are two 
general assumptions: 1. the clause is a verbal representation 
of some mental representation or underlying structure 
existing at the time of utterance formulation and 2. the 
mental representation or underlying structure is an 
interpretation of real world information. Many of these 
approaches construe the characteristics of the mental 
representation from the linguistic utterance itself. However, 
it would appear that if the mental representation is an 
interpretation of reality, the place to start is with reality 
itself and how we process it. 
6 
1.2 Requirements of a Linguistic Production Model 
Levelt (1989) outlines the requirements of a linguistic 
production model beginning from "reality." In the experiments 
of this research, "reality" is determined by the visual 
stimuli of the computer screen. From this reality, our model 





















Visual stimuli on 
computer screen 
Number and type of 
clauses: progressive 
vs. non-progressive 
Components of a linguistic production model 
(Levelt, 1988). 
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A speaker utilizes the information at hand, forming a mental 
representation and preverbal message from that 
representation. The speaker then selects the linguistic forms 
that will be used to communicate the message. These 
selections are then verbally articulated by muscular 
manipulation of the oral tract (Note: I will deal only with 
the first two stages and the verbal output while ignoring the 
physiological details of verbal articulation) . For example, 
from the data of subjects A and B above (in Table 1) , I am 
interested in specifying how those subjects approached the 
real world information and how they formed their mental 
representations from that information. It is these mental 
representations that are used to form the preverbal message 
that will eventually be articulated. The differences between 
"He's chopping another piece" or "He chops at the wood" must 
exist in the mental representations (assuming that they speak 
the "same" language) . The different form represents a 
different function in articulating a difference between 
mental representations. It is not just a correlation between 
a particular form and a particular mental representation. 
Rather, the mental representation determines what form will 
be used. The model must therefore formalize the 
deterministic relationships that exist between mental and 
verbal representations. 
Because the verbal output is ultimately built from a 
particular mental representation existing at a particular 
time of formulation, the model must provide a localistic 
explanation. Such an explanation assumes mental 
representations are dynamic. The deterministic relationships 
operate upon the formulation of each specific utterance from 
a specific mental representation at a specific time. 
1. 3 Inferring the Mental Representation Using 
Visual Information 
8 
Defining deterministic relationships between mental 
representation and linguistic clause requires "getting at" 
the mental representation of the speaker. To rely only on the 
linguistic data would constrain us to infer the mental 
representation on a non-objective basis. As Osgood and Bock 
(1977) point out, it is for this very reason that few studies 
have addressed the question of "where do sentences come 
from." 
The difficulty has been primarily methodological - to 
devise controlled experimental procedures that maximize 
linguistic production variables and minimize linguistic 
comprehension variables, that is, to "force" subjects 
into Speaker rather than Listener roles. But if the 
subject is to be in a natural Speaker role, how is the 
investigator to exercise any control over what he is to 
speak about [that is exercise any control over the 
mental representation]? . . .  there are naturalistic 
methods by which the ideas to be expressed can be 
constrained across speakers without using linguistic 
inputs. One of these has been dubbed "Simply Describing" 
(Osgood, 1971) •. • in which what is comprehended (and 
9 
hence constrains what is to be expressed) is entered via 
non linguistic, perceptual channels. 
(Osgood and Bock, 1977:89) 
A few researchers, including Osgood and Bock, have used the 
"Simply Describing" procedure employing the non-linguistic 
perceptual channel of vision. This research also employs the 
visual channel. The experimental paradigm requires that 
subjects simultaneously describe an animated film as they 
watch it (online production). Controlling the information in 
the animated film allows us to infer the information being 
used to build the mental representation - not from the 
linguistic description but from the animation itself. The 
online task reduces further processing of the visual 
information unlike a postview description which would allow 
the subject to rely on a further processed memorial 
representation. The animation medium permits the experimenter 
to manipulate different aspects of the stimuli such as 
temporal sequencing and availability, direction and speed of 
animation characters. The model of information processing 
(based on Tomlin, 1991) used in this experiment hypothesizes 
that the manipulation of these variables will govern the 
cognitive state of perceptual receptors (habituated or 
dishabituated) and the allocation of focal attention. 
Receptor state and attention allocation are then utilized in 
forming a mental representation of the real world. This 
mental representation is subsequently reflected in the 
10 
clausal description thereby revealing its relationship to the 
mental representation of the animation. In this particular 
research, the manipulation of the visual stimuli is used to 
produce progressive or non-progressive forms. 
1. 4 Summary 
The following pages will expand upon each of the stages 
found between the raw sensory information and the verbal 
output. We will begin with the cognitive characteristics of 
the sensory receptors and the perceptual system, examining 
the nature of the information that will be used to form a 
mental representation. From the mental representation, we 
will examine how information is extracted to form a 
proposition that will eventually be verbally articulated. 
Ultimately, the model will be used to explain what motivates 
the progressive/non-progressive aspectual distinction. 
Chapter 2 presents the information processing model and 
explains how sensory information is parsed and organized to 
form a mental representation. Chapter 3 examines how the 
constructed mental representation is used to form a preverbal 
message that will eventually be articulated. Chapter 4 
reviews current ideas concerning aspectual distinction and 
how the model is able to account for these ideas. 
Chapter 5 explains the design of the films used to test 
the model and presents the results of the experiments. 
1 1  
Chapter 6 discusses the relevance of the results to the 
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter and cognitively 
recasts a number of present ideas concerning aspectual 
distinction. In addition, a brief summary of this research is 
presented. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PARSING OF INFORMATION 
The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of 
impressions which has to be organized by our minds 
12 
and this means largely the linguistic systems in our 
minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and 
ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are 
parties to an agreement to organize it this way -- an 
agreement that holds throughout our speech community and 
is codified in the patterns of our language. 
(Whorf, 1956: 213) 
We use language to talk about what's around us or to 
communicate the abstract ideas from our minds. Thus, 
subjects A and B of chapter 1 used language to describe the 
film that they were watching. It is important to note that 
their description is not a description of the film but of 
what they saw in the film - their perceptions of the film. 
Thus language holds direct relationship to mental 
representation - not "reality. " Mental representation, on the 
other hand, holds a more direct relationship to reality. 
This reality consists of the continuous flow of information 
that bombards our sensory receptors. I, as an experimenter, 
only have direct access to reality and the linguistic 
utterances that describe the interpretation of reality. In 
order to understand how verbal aspect is related to mental 
13 
representation, I must also understand how we organize 
reality in order to produce a coherent mental representation 
- how we "cut nature up. " By placing boundaries on the 
continuous flow of information, speakers are able to 
manipulate discrete units of information. In the following 
section, we will examine various proposals that describe how 
speakers might go about placing these boundaries. The last 
proposal is cognitive in nature, providing the cognitive 
means by which a mental representation is formed. In chapter 
3, we will examine how this cognitively derived mental 
representation affects aspect. 
2. 1 Previous Ideas Concerning the Parsing 
of Information 
2. 1. 1 Clark and Clark (1977) : Experiential Chunking 
A few linguists refer to the "cutting" process as 
"chunking. " Clark and Clark (1977) refer to experiential 
chunking in which speakers propositionalize the flow of 
information. The "cut points" for the proposition are 
determined largely by conceptual salience, verbalizability 
and pertinence. Conceptual salience is defined in terms of 
the different 
'joints', points of rapid change from one state to 
another, and 'intervals' in between those joints . . .  
people are also aware of states that continue with no 
change at all . . . .  What gets turned into propositions 
are the joints, intervals and states that people 
experience. (p. 238) 
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Verbalizability refers to whether or not the above joints, 
intervals or states "correspond to propositions that can be 
expressed in the language." Whether or not a chunk is 
pertinent depends on the task of the speaker. Together, these 
determine whether or not an experiential chunk will be 
propositionalized and eventually linguistically encoded. 
2. 1. 2 Miller and Johnson-Laird: Change and Events 
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) also link "change" to 
the conceptualization of an event. "Change" denotes "the 
perception that the pattern of stimulation at some particular 
moment is different from the pattern of stimulation at a 
preceding moment" (p. 79) . Events are the kind of changes that 
people talk about. They point out that all events consist of 
a change but not all changes are encoded as events. 
2. 1. 3. Chafe (1977) : Subchunking 
Chafe (1977: 215-246) refers to subchunking in which 
larger chunks of information are broken down into 
progressively smaller chunks until "some stopping point is 
reached. " Chafe briefly refers to "salience" as a criteria 
for subchunking. He points out that salience is a complex 
phenomenon, involving unexpectedness, relevance, and other 
phenomena requiring further investigation. He also refers to 
15 
subchunking as a process influenced by previously learned 
schemata or "stereotyped patterns." These schema provide the 
organizational structure for the incoming information and 
determine what is and what is not relevant. For example, the 
schema of "going to a restaurant" might include subchunks of 
"picking up your date, driving to the restaurant, checking in 
coats, waiting to be seated, ordering meals, etc." Once a 
speaker has arrived at an optimal level of subchunking, these 
subchunks can be propositionalized. The optimal level is 
determined by the schema itself. Thus, one would not subchunk 
the driving process in the above restaurant paradigm (one 
would not talk about "pushing the clutch in, letting off the 
gas pedal, etc." in a description of going to a restaurant) . 
2.1.4 Tomlin (1991) : Series of Events 
Tomlin (1991) suggests that speakers must first "bring 
order to the flow of activity before him by organizing into a 
network of events" (p.68) . He defines event in traditional 
Gibsonian1 terms - an event is a minimal change of some 
specified type wrought over an object or object-complex 
within a determinate region of space-time (Shaw and 
Pittenger, 1978) . 
The above approaches to the organization of information 
all appear to use change for slicing information. Newtson 
(Newtson, 1973; Newtson and Engquist, 1976) refers to these 
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changes as "break points" - they break up the continual flow 
of information. Imagine a boy, a ball and a window. Imagine 
the boy walking up to the ball, bending over, picking up the 
ball and throwing it. Imagine the ball flying through the air 
and hitting a window. In this imagined scenario, large 
changes take place when: 
(1) a. the boy changes from standing to bending 
b. the ball changes location from on the ground to 
in the boy's hand 
c. the boy's arm position changes from at rest to 
in throwing motion 
d. the ball changes from being in the boy's hand to 
flying through the air 
e. the state of the window changes from intact to 
broken 
The perception of these changes is then used to chunk 
experience. Of course, we could attune ourselves to finer 
degrees of change as in: 
(2) a. the boy changes from standing to bending 
al. the boy's knees change from straight to bent 
a2. the boy's back changes from straight to bent 
a3. the boy's arm goes from rest to reaching 
down 
We might attune ourselves to these finer changes in slow 
motion replay or if asked to describe all body movements. Our 
cognitive model of information processing requires a 
mechanism whereby changes can be recognized and utilized in 
building a mental representation. It also requires a 
component in which only those changes that are "significant" 
are used in propositionalizing the mental representation 
construction. Such a model is presented in the following 
pages. 
2.2 A Cognitive Model of Information Processing 
17 
A cognitive model that explains the relationship between 
language and mental representation must incorporate the 
entire process - from the presentation of the stimuli and 
detection of changes therein, to the task of the linguistic 
producer ( whereby the degree of changes to be noticed is 
determined), to the formation of the linguistic utterance. 
Tomlin ( 19 91) has formulated such a model adapting Cowan's 
( 19 8 8) model of information processing. The adaptation 
applies a condensed version of Cowan's model to the specific 
task of linguistic production. In the model presented here 
( Figure 2), I have taken the task-specific components of 
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FIGURE 2. A c ognitive model of information 
processing f or linguistic production. 
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Here, I will briefly describe the different components of the 
model in terms of the experiment of this research. I will 
then provide a detailed explanation of the working of each 
component of the model. 
2 . 2 . 1  A Brief Overview of the Model 
Subjects are asked to describe animations while watching 
them on a computer screen. The animations are simple everyday 
occurrences such as : a man walking from his home to a 
restaurant, a bicyclist going by a tree and stopping at a 
light, an airplane flying through the sky, a boy throwing a 
ball at a window, and many others. The task of the subject 
consists of two components : behavioral and rhetorical. The 
behavioral task is to watch what is happening on the screen. 
The rhetorical task is to describe what they see occurring on 
the computer screen. It is the task that determines the 
degree of change that should be noted. The central executive 
takes the requirements of this task and allocates cognitive 
faculties accordingly. In the case of the experiment, it 
directs visual attention to the stimuli within the field of 
the computer screen ( orienting the eyes towards the computer 
screen, foveating stimuli that are of interest) . These 
stimuli are perceived by the sensory receptors which send the 
information to a very brief sensory store. Information is 
briefly processed here and then sent on to short term memory 
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- an "activated" subset of long-term memory. The central 
executive allocates focal attention to those stimuli that are 
most relevant to the task. Focal attention is the cognitive 
capacity which allows an organism to selectively process some 
information while not processing other information. This 
capacity enables an organism to respond to its environment 
and avoid "information overload. " Because our task is quite 
general, most subjects reported only changes to "characters" 
(people, objects) on the screen and not the components of 
which they were made up (i. e. arms, legs, etc. ) .  It is the 
task that instructed the central executive to attend to 
stimuli only to the level of "character. " Focal attention is 
normally allocated to information coming from dishabituated 
receptors (changing and hence most "interesting and 
relevant") while unchanging stimuli do not receive the same 
degree of processing due to the habituation of their 
receptors. Thus, at the moment of a boy throwing a ball, the 
changing or dishabituated boy and ball will receive focal 
attention while the static or habituated window will not. The 
mental representation consists of this information (state of 
receptors, focal attention) that is in activated (or short­
term) memory. From this information, a propositional 
representation or preverbal message is formed. The central 
executive directs this representation to the formulator where 
the rules of the functional grammar determine what lexical 
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and grammatical forms will be used to verbally communicate 
the message. With respect to this research, it is at this 
stage that either the progressive or non-progressive form 
will be selected. These forms will then undergo verbal 
articulation - a controlled muscular action governed by rules 
that are phonological and biomechanical in nature. 
2. 2. 2 The Importance of the Task 
Because the verbal expression of progressives or non­
progressives is dependent upon the earlier stages of the 
model, it is crucial that the task, one of the first stages, 
be clearly communicated to the subject in the experimentation 
of this research. It is the task which helps the central 
executive of the subject determine what information is and is 
not relevant. It is also the behavioral task that instructs 
the subject to describe online - to not rely on a processed 
memorial representation. If the subject does not describe 
while online, our knowledge of the structure of a particular 
mental representation is severely limited. This, in turn, 
limits our ability to determine any relationships between 
mental representation and aspectual form. 
The influence of task on information parsing captures 
the ideas of Chafe (1977) and Clark and Clark (1977). Chafe 
notes that the salient information is allocated the most 
attention. Salience, Chafe states, is partially based on the 
22  
speaker's preconceptions as to what is important and what is 
trivial while Clark and Clark note the importance of 
pertinence in experiential chunking. That information which 
is pertinent is often used to establish "cut points." The 
general task of "describe what you see" deems minute changes 
as non pertinent and trivial. Such changes will not be used 
in parsing the flow of information. 
2.2.3 Granularity 
Chafe's "optimal level" of subchunking is also 
determined by the task in that the task determines the schema 
with which the speaker approaches the information. For 
example, a sports announcer approaches instant replay with a 
different schema than "real-time" announcing. The schema of 
instant replay requires attention to a much finer level of 
detail and hence the description is typically much more 
detailed. Speakers can shift the process of conceptualization 
from a course-grained level of granularity to a fine-grained 
level if finer details and distinctions become relevant 
( Hobbs, 19 85; Croft, 19 91 :163-4) . These levels are partly 
determined by what the speaker wishes to talk about. What 
the speaker wishes to talk about is defined by the task. Thus 
the task itself helps the central executive determine what 
level of detail should be attended to. This in turn, affects 
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which changes are and are not noticed - the changes that are 
used to parse the information. 
Although not a part of this investigation, note that the 
model allows for a task that directs attention to long-term 
memories rather than to the perception of stimuli. The model 
provides the basis upon which both abstract thought and 
perceptual information can be linguistically encoded (Figure 
3) • 
Task 
The task determines where 
the central executive will 
direct attention. 
i.e. determines what stimuli 
are relevant 
Behavioral Rhetorical Attention can be 
directed outward, to 
stimuli, or inward, to 
long-term memories. 







directs attention and controls 
voluntary processing 
Long term store 
Summary of the interaction between the task 
component and the central executive. 
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2. 3 The Nature of Sensory Information 
2. 3. 1 Functioning of the Perceptual System 
Once the task has been identified to the central 
executive, attention can be directed to the relevant stimuli. 
This is done by directing the necessary sensory receptors 
towards, in this case, the computer screen and the objects 
and occurrences taking place on it. The perception of the 
stimuli is accomplished by the receptors and therefore any 
information concerning the stimuli is in the form given by 
the receptors. Our model must be able to explain how changes 
in this information are recognized (i. e. how is the change 
from boy standing to boy bending recognized?) so that parsing 
can occur. 
The following quote from Miller and Johnson-Laird ( 1976) 
briefly explains the underlying assumptions of much of the 
research being done in the area of sensory perception: 
the perceptual system is designed to preserve 
information and discard redundancy. Things that change 
take priority over things that remain constant; 
constancy is expected, the perceptual system tries to 
minimize surprise; wherever possible, sensory changes 
are relegated to predictable states, so that the amount 
of unpredictable information that must be processed will 
not overload the conceptual system. Once the state of 
the world has been conceptually established, the 
perceptual system needs to report only the information 
required to update it, only the information about 
significant changes. (p. 88) 
2.3.2  Updating Information : Comparison Against 
Existing Neural Models of Predictable States 
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In accounting for these characteristics of the 
perceptual system, Cowan's model (1988) uses Sokolov's 
mechanism for updating information . Essentially, Sokolov 
states that unchanging stimuli are relegated to a predictable 
state ( Sokolov, 19 63) . A neural model is produced with the 
unchanging receptor information. When changes occur, the 
organism orients itself to the changes to update the model. 
The orienting response is made up of both neural and 
physiological changes that respond to the detection of a 
novel stimulus ( Ohman, 1979; Posner & Rothbart, 1980; 
Rohrbaugh, 1 9 84; Sokolov, 1963) .  It directs focal attention 
to the changing stimuli and habituates to those stimuli that 
do not change or are insignificant to the organism. 
Sokolov suggested that the primary mechanism behind the 
orienting response involves the subject's neural model 
of the physical characteristics of the environment as 
the subject habituates to the stimulus. The incoming 
stimulation is compared to the already established 
neural model. If there is a discrepancy between the two, 
an orienting response to the discrepant stimulus is 
elicited. Any physical change in the unattended 
stimulation would produce a mismatch with the 
description in memory, which would result in orienting 
( dishabituation) to this stimulus channel. 
( Cowan, 19 8 8 : 17 8) 
2.3.1 Characteristics of the Orienting Response 
and Habituation 
Pavlov labelled the orienting response as the "What is 
it?" reflex and believed it was responsible for the 
orientation of sensory receptors towards novel eliciting 
stimuli. By so doing, the receptors increase their 
sensitivity to the stimuli (Turpin, 1973: 3; Pavlov, 1927) . 
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Posner and Petersen (1990) have confirmed these early 
Pavlovian ideas. Visual orientation results in the foveation 
of stimuli - i.e. the eyes move in order that the stimuli of 
orientation are registered by the fovea. This results in 
faster response times (in reaction time experiments) , greater 
electrical activity and reports of stimuli at lower 
thresholds. Orientation allows increased and more efficient 
processing to occur and is produced under one of these three 
conditions: (a) when there is a change in the physical 
characteristics of unattended stimuli, (b) when there is a 
stimulus of long-standing significance to the subject, and 
(c) when the unattended channel contains information that has 
been primed by recent context (Cowan, 1988: 178) . The result 
of orientation is the dishabituation of the sensory 
receptors. In the account of verbal aspect presented here, it 
is precisely this information that will determine the 
selection of progressive or non-progressive aspect. 
Specifically, reference to an established habituated neural 
model will be encoded with the progressive while relating the 
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dishabituations to changes between models will be encoded by 
the non-progressive punctual form of a verb. 
Present technology already provides objective methods by 
which to measure states of habituation and dishabituation: 
(a) vasomotor measures in which pulse measures or blood 
content and/or volume measures are made at different sites on 
the organism (typically the finger or the forehead) ; (b) 
electrodermal measures in which skin conductance is measured 
and most recently (c) event-related brain potential 
measurement in which electrical activity of the brain is 
measured using EEG caps or electrodes on the skull (Turpin, 
1983; Rohrbaugh et al, 1990) . A state of habituation is 
demonstrated by little electrical activity and "normal" 
volume or content measures. Changes in stimulation produce 
increased electrical activity and changes in the 
volume/content measures. Subsequent unchanging stimulation 
will result in decreased activity and shifts toward the 
"normal." The orienting response declines in amplitude and 
probability as a function of repeated presentations of the 
eliciting unchanging stimulus (Stephenson and Siddle, 
1983: 183) . This lowering of sensitivity is habituation. 
Although not used in the experiments of this research, these 
electrical and vaso-cardial measures could be used to help us 
determine the state of information in the mind and their 
correlations with progressive or non-progressive aspect. 
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These measures would provide a more direct procedure of 
determining the nature of the mental representation than from 
the stimuli themselves. 
Figure 4 below portrays the relationship between the 
stimulus change and dishabituation of the orienting response 
and sensory receptors. When a change in stimulation occurs, 
the orienting response dishabituates (represented by the 
white areas in the bar representation and peaks in the line 
graph of electrical activity) . If no further change in 
stimulation occurs, the receptors habituate to the 
stimulation, forming a new model of the information. (The 
habituated state is represented by the black areas in the bar 
representation) . If a number of rapid and different changes 

















Toe object turns 
and m oves left 
M oves up Moves Moves 
right down 
FIGURE 4 .  S timul us c hange and its relationship to 
dishabituation/habituation of the sensory 
receptors. 
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From the results of  previous research, we know that 
greater c hange in relation to previous stimulation produces 
inc reased amplitude in the resulting orientation response 
(Stephenson and S iddle, 1 983 : 22 4 ) . We also know that 
patterned stimulation (i. e .  a light blinks three times and 
then stops; it blinks f our times and then stops ; repeat the 
pattern three blinks-pause-four blinks-pause over and over) 
is habituated much faster if the period of time between 
patterns is shorter. This time period is called the 
interstimulus interval (IS I ) . S tephenson and S iddle 
( 1 9 83 :2 12 )  state that " short IS is  produce more rapid 
habituation in the short term since there is less opportunity 
f or stimulus representation to decay from [ the short term 
store ] between stimuli. " Figure 5 below is a representation 
of the level of dishabituation/ habituation existing during 
the perception of an object moving across a screen with 
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FIGURE 5 .  The relationship between patterned stimulation 
and levels of habituation. 
At point A, a change is clearly apparent : that of now moving 
upwards to the right . At B there is clearly another change : 
that of now moving downwards to the right. However, as this 
pattern repeats itself, we find the receptors habituating to 
the movement. By points E-L, the receptors are completely 
habituated to the motion and the change in direction no 
longer causes dishabituation. Changes are therefore 
recognized only at A, B, C, and possibly D. At point L, a 
change is also recognized in that a discrepancy occurs when 
the pattern of the existing receptor model is broken. We see 
this occur often in everyday life and in the films used in 
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the experiment. A person walking has many changes in it - the 
changes between one leg moving forward, as another one moves 
back and then the reverse of that. We quickly habituate to 
the walking motion due to our previous experience with 
"walking" and the regularity of the motion. A steady-state 
model of walking activity is quickly formed. One often 
habituates to incessant "background" noise only to 
dishabituate and attend to it when the noise disappears -
when the pattern is broken. 
In summary, given the formation of a model of 
stimulation, changes in stimulation will result in the 
dishabituation of the orienting response (characterized by 
greater receptor sensitivity and increased activity of the 
autonomic nervous system) . Subsequent non-change will result 
in an updated model and habituation of the orienting 
response. Ideally, we could determine when a given speaker 
has recognized a change in stimuli by measuring the increased 
electrical activity due to the orienting response. We could 
then compare the presence of these dishabituations with the 
linguistic data and determine what relationships exist. 
Unfortunately, the equipment and the know-how to obtain and 
analyze EEG samplings of brain states are unavailable for 
this present research. In my experiment, I infer the 
dishabituation state of the receptors by referring to the 
pattern or change in pattern of stimulation itself. 
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2 . 4  Parts o f  the Mental Representation that Might 
be Linguistically Encoded 
On the basis  of the above functioning of the perceptual 
system, we see that the mental representation is  made up of  
the interrelated parts in ( 3 )  ( also shown within the amoeboid 
" activated memory " in Figure 6 below ) : 
( 3 ) a .  Stimuli in activated memory:  those stimuli that 
have been processed by receiving attention . 
Stimul i  I 
Voluntarily attended 
b .  Focally attended stimuli:  those stimuli that are 
receiving maximal processing due to orientation 
towards those stimuli 
c .  Neural model of  stimuli: the model which is  
continually updated and embodie s :  
i .  the predictable states o f  the stimuli 
i i . the relationship between stimuli . 
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FIGURE 6 .  
Long term store 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
OF PERCEPTUAL EVENTS 
Relationship between stimuli 
Components of the mental representation open 
to encoding in a language . 
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From the neural models and the dishabituations between these 
models, the speaker will extract information that can be 
propositionalized and linguistically encoded. The next 
chapter examines how these parts of the mental representation 
are propositionalized. The following chapter describes how 
propositional structures are then encoded - giving rise to 
progressive or non-progressive forms. 
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Notes 
1. In this Gibsonian framework, perceptual changes delineate 
events, providing units in the flow of information ( Shaw et. 
al, 1978; Warren and Shaw, 1985) . 
CHAPTER III 
FROM NEURAL MODEL TO PROPOSITIONAL REPRESENTATION 
TO LINGUISTIC ARTICULATION 
3. 1 Production of Neural Models by the 
Perceptual System 
3 5  
The previous chapter described how information is 
processed by the perceptual system. The system, as noted, 
processes information coming from sensory receptors, forming 
a neural model on the basis of those stimuli in predictable 
states. The system recognizes model discrepancies and orients 
to those discrepancies so that the source of change can be 
more efficiently processed and the discrepancies more 
efficiently relegated to a predictable state or model. Thus, 
at any particular time that the brain is processing 
perceptual information, there exists a model of the stimuli 
in short term or activated memory. A portion of the 
information in this model is in focal attention, receiving 
maximal processing. 
The actual forming of the model depends not only upon 
the stimuli, but also upon past experience and the task at 
hand. As noted before, the task helps determine which stimuli 
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should be processed and at what level of granularity. 
Previous experience with similar stimuli will also affect 
model formation. A speaker introduced to a situation in 
which he/she has had no previous experience will have greater 
difficulty assigning the novel information to a predictable 
state. Previous experience facilitates relegation of 
information to a predictable state - to a particular neural 
model. 
Stimulus information is thus perceptually parsed into a 
contiguous series of neural models separated by discrepancies 
to those models. For example, in the man picking up the axe 
scenario found in Table 1, we might find the following 
contiguous series of models (Figure 7) : 
Part of model 
that does not 
change: _.,. 
The man's general 
size, sex, color, 
etc. 








pick up and 
stand up 
• 
Discrepancy as he 
begins to walk 
towards wood 
pile 
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lliE: . :::: ,.l.� .. . .  
t t t 
" ~ 
t 
Model of Model of Model of Model of 
man bending standing walking 
standing over up towards 
woodpile 
TIME 
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Contiguous series of neural models and 
dishabituations produced while watching a man 
pick up an axe and walk to a woodpile . 
As one can see, this representation divides incoming 
information into a contiguous series of models separated by 
discrepancies with previous models. These models and 
discrepancies will provide the boundaries and chunks of 
information from which preverbal messages or propositions 
will be formed. The way in which the speaker 
propositionaliz es the models and discrepancies will determine 
the eventual lexical/ grammatical selection of progressive or 
non-progressive f orms . The question now arises, "How does the 
speaker propositionalize these models?" 
3. 2 Propositionalizing Available Information 
3.2.1 Chafe: Propositionalizing Objects, Events 
and Situations 
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Linguistically identifiable information must be 
extracted from these models. In order to do this, the 
information must undergo what Chafe (1977: 215-246) calls 
propositionalizing. In this process, "objects" are 
differentiated from "events" and "situations. " "Objects" are 
particular in space but not in time (time-stable) while 
"events" and "situations" are particular to both space and 
time (transitory) . 
With respect to the neural models mentioned above, 
"objects" are those stimuli that remain essentially the same 
- even through the dishabituations. "Events" are the changes 
that occur to those stimuli and "situations" are the neural 
models that exist at particular points in time. In Chafe ' s  
propositionalizing, the speaker decides on a propositional 
structure that will assign various roles to the objects 
involved in the situations and events. Eventually, 
appropriate words or phrases will be found to communicate the 
ideas of these objects, events and situations in a process 
that Chafe labels "categorizing." 
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3.2.2 Osgood and Bock: Event Cognitions 
Osgood and Bock (1977) similarly capture the differences 
between objects, events and situations and how they are 
related propositionally in what they call an "event 
cognition." This cognition is defined 
as the representation in the OPERATOR of a perceptual 
event or linguistic sequence [as a listener ] involving a 
single action or a stative relation between two 
perceived entities. (p.91) 
The OPERATOR is what gives structure to the states, events 
and entities in the cognition. Schematically, they represent 
the event cognition as shown in Figure 8. 
F IGURE 8. 
/ M1 -- (M) --> M2 � 
the meaning of j . the meaning of 
one perceived the mean�ng of another perceived 
entity later of the perceived . I t f • . . entity, a er o an 
subject NP action or stative . 
relation, later of obJect noun 
a verb phrase phrase 
Event cognitions as represented by Osgood and 
Bock (1977: 92) . 
Van Voorst (1988) uses a very similar representation for 
events, also grounding them in objects of initiation and 








Subject NP Object NP 
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FIGURE 9. Event representation of Van Voorst ( 19 8 8 : 10) . 
3.2 . 3  Tomlin : Forming EVENT Representations From 
Parameters and Change 
Tomlin ( 19 91) labels Chafe ' s  "objects " and Osgood and 
Bock ' s  "entities " as parameters - "the stable conceptual 
units with the field. " The field is "the conceptual arena in 
which activity or change occurs " ( p. 6 8) . In the experiment of 
this research, the field is the stage of the computer screen 
while the parameters are the objects or entities presented on 
the screen. Actions are those changes that occur to the 
parameters. As noted in chapter 2, Tomlin defines "event " as 
the change wrought-over one or more parameters. These changes 
and the relationships between parameters are identified by an 
arc between parameters, such as in Figure 6 above. 
3. 3 Cognitive Definitions of EVENT , PROCESS 
and STATE 
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Using the representation in Figure 4, we can cognitively 
recast the different propositional structures presented by 
the above researchers. In the next chapter, we will examine 
how these propositional structures or preverbal messages are 
then translated into linguistic utterances. 
Objects, entities and parameters are defined by those 
units of the model that are relatively stable. Their 
stability is defined by their lack of change through 
dishabituations or model discrepancies. Thus, in the model of 
the man carrying the hatchet, the stimuli of man and hatchet 
form relatively stable units in the neural model - i. e. the 
man continues to have the same size body, head, etc. 
Events and actions are defined similarly to the events 
of Tomlin. Uppercase letters are used to distinguish the 
formal definition presented here. An EVENT occurs when there 
has been a change of state wrought over one or more 
parameters. These changes are identified by the 
dishabituations caused by discrepancies with existing neural 
models. Tomlin (1987) uses attentional shifts to define 
episode boundaries. In this case, the dishabituations of the 
orienting response act as boundaries for the EVENT. Thus 
EVENT is defined as follows: 
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(4)  EVENT : the conceptualiz ed change that brings 
about the change of state between any two neural 
models ( N 1 and N2 ) . Such a conceptualiz ed change 
is always bounded by an i nitial dishabituation 
to model N i  and a terminal dishabituation 
preceding model N2. In some cases the initial 
and terminal dishabituation may be the same. 
Note the emphasis of any in the definition. Thus , i n  Figure 
1 0  below, a speaker may construe the activity during A ,  B or 
C as an EVENT. 
Discrepancy Discrepancy Discrepancy as he 
as he as he begins to walk 
begins to begins to towards wood 










Model of walking 
towards woodpile 
A 
FIGURE 1 0. Possible EVENT conceptualiz ations. 
There is a very quick change of state that occurs in A 
between the " standing" model and the "bending" model (i. e. 
" He bends"). The dishabituation which terminates the standing 
model is the same dishabituation which begins the bending 
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model. The EVENT spans only one dishabituation. This is 
characteristic of those EVENTS that are truly "punctual " (e. g. 
" The twig snaps. " ) .  How�ver, EVENTS can also be construed 
over more than one dishabituation as in B and C. In B, the 
change conceptualized in the EVENT involves the change of 
state from the standing model (N1) to the point at which the 
new standing model (N2) begins ( "He bends over. " ) .  In C, the 
change conceptualized in the EVENT involves the change of 
state from the standing model (N1) to the point at which the 
walking model (N2) begins (i. e. "He picks something up. " -
involves bending, grasping, and standing back up) . Which 
EVENT is chosen by the speaker is dependent upon the 
requirements of the task and the degree of change. It the 
task requires a greater degree of granularity, the speaker 
will construe each change as more significant (refer to 
previous section 2. 2.3).  
A speaker may also encode a particular neural model 
(represented by black) existing at any particular point in 
time. The conditions that prompt such coding will be 
discussed in chapter 4. There are two types of these models: 
temporary and time-stable models. As shown in Figure 7, time­
stable models embody the time-stable aspects of the stimuli. 
For the character of the man in the film, these include his 
height, his sex, his shoe size, etc. The time-stability of 
these models is partially determined by previous experience. 
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In real time, a model in activated memory must begin at a 
certain time. It does not exist infinitely backwards and 
forwards in time. Experience captured by memory, however, 
extrapolates the beginning and endpoints of the model. For 
example, my previous experience with humans allows me to 
recognize that height, shoe size, etc. are traits that do not 
change quickly. 
Temporary models represent the temporary situations (cf. 
Chafe's "situations"; refer to section 3. 2. 1) in which the 
man finds himself - the situation of standing, the situation 
of bending, etc. Models do not represent EVENTS. Rather, I 
propose the following definitions: 
(5) a. PROCESS: a temporary representation (model) of a 
situation existing at particular point in time. 
b. STATE: a relatively static and ongoing 
representation (model) of enduring states. 
In propositionalizing the information, the speaker can refer 
to the change between models, or the models themselves, each 
being encoded by different verbal and aspectual forms. 
CHAPTER IV 
FROM PROPOSITION TO LINGUISTIC UTTERANCE 
4. 1 The Relationship Between Aspect , EVENT , 
PROCESS and STATE 
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EVENTS, PROCESSES, and STATES have cognitively definable 
structure and these structures have different verbal 
representations. In English, EVENTS are encoded by punctual 
verbs, while PROCESSES are encoded with the progressive form 
of the verb and STATES are encoded with stative verbs, in 
particular the copula. To be more precise, punctual verbs 
encode the action that brings about the change between two 
neural models; progressives encode the particular state of a 
temporary neural model at a particular time and statives, 
such as the verb "to be," encode states of relatively 
permanent models. The following sections below demonstrate 
how traditional ideas of aspect can be recast in the 
cognitive terms described above. 
4. 2 A Cognitive Recast of Existing Ideas 
Concerning Aspect 
4. 2. 1 Chafe: Progressive Signals Lack of 
Known Endpoint 
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Like others, Chafe ( 1971) identifies the use of the 
progressive when the representation consists of an event or 
series of events that "are spread out over a period of time. " 
These events are understood to be in progress with respect to 
the time axis indicated by the utterance ( i. e. present: "He ' s  
picking up the wood"; past "He was picking up the wood") . 
More importantly , Chafe notes that: 
this period is not unlimited in extent but is 
understood to be subject to eventual termination. 
( Emphasis mine; p. 175) . 
Thus, subject A, in using the form "he ' s  picking up the wood" 
( Table 1) , has a representation that conceptualizes the man 
as in PROCESS of picking up wood and that this process will 
eventually end. Subject B ,  on the other hand , has 
conceptualized the entire time-spanned event involving the 
picking up of wood. The event is no longer in progress - it 
has already terminated. Thus subject B uses the form "Pulls 
out some wood. " 
4. 2 . 2  Comrie: Progressive Encodes Internal 
S tructure Versus External Structure. 
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Comrie (1976 : 16)  points out that the non-progressive 
form, "indicates the view of [ the] situation as a whole" 
while progressive forms pay attention to the "internal 
structure" of the situation. The representation of subject A 
in "He's picking up some wood" refers to a specific point in 
time and space - the internal structure of the situation at 
hand. Subject B ("Pulls out some wood") has a representation 
that encompasses a span of time. The time-span is delimited 
by boundaries on both ends - it has external structure. A 
physical analogy might be a situation in which one is looking 
at red object very close up, so close that one can only see 
red and not its shape. From such a perspective, a person 
might only conceptualize the object ' s  redness. Upon looking 
at it from a distance, the conceptualization may capture the 
identity of the object. The former looks only at the internal 
attributes of the object while the latter identifies the 
external boundaries of the object and hence the object 
itself. 
4. 2 . 3  Giv6n: Boundedness, Unboundedness of Activity 
Giv6n (1984) similarly approaches the contrast between 
progressive and non-progressive forms. He states that 
progressive/durative/continuous aspect 
c onstrues an event as having no initial or terminal 
boundaries . I n  c ontrast, the punctual aspect construes 
an event as having such boundaries. (p.2 7 4 ) 
4 . 2 . 4  The Cognitive Recast 
The three views above provide a general summary of the 
semantic notions believed to be a part of viewpoint and how 
they aff ect aspect. These ideas are summariz ed in Table 2 
below : 
TABLE 2. S ummary : Characteristics of P rogressive and 
Punctual Aspect 
Punctual aspect 
Complete, whole unit 
External 
E ncompasses span of 
time 
Bounded by initial and 
terminal boundaries 
Progressive aspect 
I n progress  but 
eventual termination 
I nternal 
Refers to a point 
in time . 
Unbounded 
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The perspective o f  this paper links the general semantic 
notions of the above to specific cognitive s tructures . 
Punctual aspect is bounded and those boundaries are provided 
f or by model disc repanc ies/dishabituations. The viewpoint is 
external because it requires access to both initial and 
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terminal boundaries requiring the speaker to conceptualize a 
span of time. The speaker must step back from a specific 
point in time and view past, present and future to 
conceptualize the event bounded by the discrepancies found at 
different points in time. Progressive aspect is unbounded 
referring only to the state of a temporary model at a 
particular point in time - an internal perspective. Statives 
similarly internally refer to the state of a model at a 
particular point in time, but that model is understood to be 





































'He's a black man.' 
FIGURE 1 1 . Conceptualizations from the contiguous series of 
neural models and their pos sible linguistic encodings . 
(JI 
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In the next section, we will examine how we can manipulate 
stimuli to influence the forming of propositional structure 
or the preverbal message and its eventual encoding with 
progressive or non-progressive aspect. 
4. 3 Manipulation of Stimuli to Produce Progressive 
Versus Non-progressive Forms 
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The real test to the validity of these cognitively based 
definitions is whether the predictions resulting from such 
definitions hold true. In this section, I will present a 
number of predictions that the definitions make and how they 
can be tested. The formal experimental designs and their 
results will be presented in the next chapter. 
4. 3. 1 Aspect and Trains 
According to the definition presented here, EVENT 
conceptualization requires an external perspective - the 
speaker must have access to the initial and terminal 
boundaries of the event. As already established, these 
boundaries are determined by dishabituations or discrepancies 
in neural models. Such access does not insure that a speaker 
will use the non-progressive form. The speaker may still 
refer to a particular model at a particular point in time. 
However, it is the position of this paper that given access 
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to both boundaries, the speaker is much more likely to encode 
an EVENT. 
The speaker must also have as part of his lexical 
inventory, a word that encompasses the boundaries as an 
EVENT. For example, a person who has no sports experience is 
unlikely to verbalize as many EVENTS as an expert in a 
particular sport. The expert is familiar with EVENT labels 
and the boundaries associated with them. 
Manipulating stimuli in such a way to motivate PROCESS 
encoding over EVENT encoding requires limiting the speaker ' s  
access to EVENT boundaries - to neural model discrepancies. 
Picture a person watching a series of trains go by. Each 
train represents a neural model and each train is separated 
by an empty space of 10 meters which represents 
dishabituation to the model. The person watches train A go 
by. It is a very short train consisting of three cars. He 
conceptualizes it as a train with a beginning and an end - as 
an EVENT. Train B is coming and is also short consisting of 
ten cars. Even before the last car passes in front of him, he 
conceptualizes the train with a beginning and an end because 
he can see the caboose coming - he can easily predict the 
terminal boundary. Again he conceptualizes it as an EVENT. 
Train C is very long, consisting of more than 200 cars. The 
viewer is not able to see the end of the train but knows that 
it will eventually come. He conceptualizes it as a PROCESS 
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because he does not have access to the caboose - the terminal 
boundary. 
Now imagine that same viewer looking through a hole in 
fence right next to the tracks. He can only see straight in 
front of him. Train A goes by. The distance between the 
engine and the caboose is short enough that he is able to put 
the two together to form an EVENT conceptualization. Train B 
is somewhat too long however. Its caboose cannot be seen 
through the hole in the fence; thus, the viewer 
conceptualizes a PROCESS. Train C seems unbearably long 
through the hole and again a PROCESS is conceptualized. 
The illustration is simplistic but demonstrates that we 
can limit access to initial and terminal boundaries in two 
ways. The first is to make the train longer. We do this by 
animating stimuli in such a way that a neural model exists 
for a longer period of time - to make an activity more 
durative. The second method is to force a perspective that 
only allows access to a small part of the train for brief 
periods of time. We can do this by producing animations that 
have smaller "fields" of view reducing the access of the 
speaker to parameters on the screen. Change or dishabituation 
is measured against parameters in the field of view. Without 
an entity to measure change against, no change can be 
recognized. In the boy, the ball and window scenario (section 
2.1.4) , the lack of a window might hamper the speaker's 
ability to predict the endpoint of the throwing event. 
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Giv6n's (1984, section 4.2.3 above) notion that 
progressive aspect is used to encode those actions that are 
more durative is explainable in the cognitive terms presented 
here. Longer predictable activity forms a neural model that 
exists for a longer time, restricting access to both initial 
and terminal boundaries of the model - thus hampering an 
EVENT conceptualization. Osgood and Bock's (1977) and Van 
Voorst's (1988, section 3.2.2 above) idea of EVENTS finding 
their termination in parameters or objects is also captured 
in the cognitive terms presented here. Our cognitive 
definition terminates EVENTS in parameters as well, if those 
parameters were the objects against which a model discrepancy 
occurred. By limiting access to those parameters, the speaker 
is less able to predict a forth-coming terminal boundary in 
an "object or parameter of termination." 
4.4 From Stimuli to Utterance: A Summary 
Our cognitive model of information processing and 
linguistic production begins at the stimuli themselves. The 
stimulation affects the building of neural models. Changes in 
stimulation cause discrepancies or dishabituations to pre­
existing neural models of predictable states. These model 
discrepancies are used as "cut points" or boundaries for 
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chunking information. From the neural models, information is 
extracted to form a proposition or preverbal message. The 
functional grammar of the language then chooses those lexical 
and grammatical forms appropriate to express the message. 
Chunks of information can be propositionalized as EVENTS if 
that chunk embodies the changes that occurred between two 
neural models (the chunk is bounded on both sides by a 
dishabituation) . PROCESSES are propositionalized when a 
speaker refers to the state of a temporary neural model and 
STATES are propositionalized when a speaker refers to the 
state of permanent neural model. By creating animations that 
reduce access to terminal boundaries, we can increase the 
probability of PROCESS conceptualization over EVENT 
conceptualization. EVENTS are articulated with non­
progressive punctual verbs while PROCESSES are articulated 
with progressive verbs (in English) . STATES are articulated 
with stative verbs. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
5.1 Association Between Use of Memorial 
Representation and Aspect 
5.1. 1  Hypothesis 
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This section and section 5. ? describe two analyses based 
on the data mentioned in section 1. 0. These analyses 
demonstrate the cognitive principles above without direct 
manipulation of the stimuli. 
The online production paradigm mentioned in section 1. 3 
forces speakers to use only the information at hand. A 
postviewing production paradigm allows speakers to rely on 
their memorial representation, providing the speaker with a 
memory of all significant models and the dishabituations in 
between them. The speaker therefore has the boundaries 
necessary to form EVENT propositions rather than PROCESS 
propositions. In comparing the two types of productions, we 
would expect the following: 
(6) Postview production allows a speaker to access 
memorial representations with both initial and 
terminal endpoints of EVENTS available. EVENTS 
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are encoded with punctuals. The discourse 
produced in postview production will therefore 
exhibit a greater frequency of punctual verbs 
and a reduced frequency of progressive verbs as 
compared to the discourse produced in online 
production. 
5 . 1. 2  S ubject Task and Data Collection 
The following task was given to subjects for the 
analysis in this section and in section 5 . 2  below. S ubjects 
were asked to watch a short 6 minute film1 twice. The first 
trial allowed the subject to practise the task of describing 
the film while watching it (on-line production) . This data 
was not analyzed. The second trial required the subject to 
once again describe the film while on online. This second set 
of online data was analyzed. In addition, subjects were asked 
to recount the story of the film from memory (postview data) . 
The descriptions of both online and postview productions were 
tape recorded and transcribed on a clause by clause basis. A 
clause was defined as any utterance that contained a verb 
(main clauses, relative clauses, complement clauses) . 
Clauses with the verbal gerund "-ing" were recorded as 
"progressive. "  This included verb forms that did not have the 
copula "to be" associated with it. These often occurred in 
relative and adverbial clauses as in (7) below. Clauses with 
" -ing" gerunds were also recorded as progressive if they were 
preceded by an inchoative verb as in (7c) : 
(7 ) a .  Okay, the man, you see a man walking out . 
b .  He chops at them, throwing them aside as he ' s  
done. 
c .  [ he ]  starts chopping at it. 
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I recorded these "non-standard" progressives as progressives 
primarily because it is the " -ing" morpheme that makes 
refere nce to the neural model (refer to section 6 . 3 )  
5 . 1 .  3 Res ults 
Table 3 and Figure 12 compare the use of progressives as 
f ound in online and postview texts . I n ge neral,  we f ind what 
we expected - progressive is used les s in postview production 
than online production . Only in subject 3 do we find a 
reverse relationship. 
TABLE 3 .  Online Versus Postview Usage of the Progressive 
SUBJECTS ONLINE POSTVIEW 
PROGRESSIVE TOTAL CLAUSES PROGRESSIVE TOTAL CLAUSES 
Subject 1 82 ( 62  % ) 13 2 7 ( 12 % ) 6 0  
Subject 2 2 6  (21% ) 12 4 8 (13 % )  6 3  
Subject 3 12 (11%)  10 9 2 0  (16 % )  12 7 
Subject 4 51 (3 6 % )  142 14 (14 % )  10 0 




Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 4 All subjects 
FIGURE 12. Percentage of progressive clauses: online and 
postview production. 
60 
The rather low use of progressives in the online task may be 
accounted for by the fact that this analysis was based on the 
second viewing of the film. This particular subject may have 
been particularly skillful in using their memorial 
representation to establish EVENT conceptualizations - even 
in online production. Using chi-square analysis, the 
probability across all four speakers that this was due to 
chance is less than 0. 0001. The association provides evidence 
that the speaker's reliance on his memorial representation 
allows him access to both initial and terminal endpoints of 
EVENTS. The sequential unfolding of activity in the online 
task does not always allow access to these boundaries leading 
to greater use of progressive and decreased use of punctuals. 
5. 2 Text-based Analysis: The Association Between 
Durativity and Aspect 
5. 2. 1  Hypothesis 
Looking only at the online data, we can also make 
another prediction. If a speaker at the time of utterance 
formulation has no idea when the next model discrepancy will 
occur or predicts that it will be some time before such a 
discrepancy does occur, he/she will use the progressive. 
Essentially, those neural models of unchanging stimuli that 
exist for longer durations will prevent the speaker from 
having access to the terminal boundary (cf. the longer 
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train) . Those models that exist f or short durations will 
allow the speaker to conceptualize the EVENT with its initial 
and terminal boundaries .  
Figure 13 below represents the speaker who, at the time 
of f ormulating both utterance A and B ( represented by the 
large points on the time line), has already experienced both 
the initial and terminal endpoints of EVENTS A and B .  The 
models of activity are relatively short lived. Under these 
c onditions, we would expect punctual f orms to be produced • 
• ·· •,,t"�. !.
;;o • 
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F IGURE 13 . 
Utterance B 
EVENT conceptualiz ations of s hort duration 
neural models ( allowing access to both initial 
and terminal endpoints of the EVENT ) . 
Figure 14 represents the speaker who , at the time of 
f ormulating uttera nce A, does not know when the next terminal 
e ndpoi nt will be or predicts that it is too f ar removed to 
permit EVENT c onceptualiz ation and thus PROCESS 
c onceptualiz ation occurs . A progres sive f orm will result . 
TIME 
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Utterance B 
PROCESS conc eptualizations at A due to lack of 
known terminal endpoint .  
Figure 15  represents the speaker who waits for a terminal 
endpoint to oc cur to the habituated model and then encodes an 
EVENT . 
TIME 





Speaker waits for terminal boundary before 
f ormulating utterance. Formulation is then 
based on an EVENT conceptualization. 
Note that the PROCESS conceptualization in Figure 14  produ c es 
a greater temporal distance to the initiation of the next 
c lause. Speakers use progressives when the terminal boundary 
of a neural model is not available or predictable - i.e. the 
speaker believes that the model will continue to exist for an 
extended duration. Therefore,  if we measure the time between 
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the initiation of each verbalized clause, we would expect 
greater periods of time following progressive clauses (as in 
Figure 14) and shorter periods of time following punctual 
clauses (as in Figures 13 and 15). The verbal clause 
initiation reflects the a short time after formulation of the 
EVENT or PROCESS (this "short time" is equal to the amount of 
time it takes to process the stimuli, form a preverbal 
message, select the forms appropriate to the message followed 
by the articulation of that message). On the basis of this, 
we predict the following: 
(7) A greater temporal distance (to the next clause 
initiation) is more likely to occur after a 
progressive clause, indicating the speaker's 
lack of access to a model endpoint. Smaller 
temporal distances to the next clause occur with 
punctuals. 
5 . 2  . 2  Method 
Online data was digitized allowing for accurate 
measurements of the time between clause initiations (as shown 
below in Figure 16). 
4.09 seconds 0.89 secs 
. .... . ..... 
The man is walking to the store He walks in and he shuts the door. 
FIGURE 1 6 . Digitiz ed speech and measurement of temporal 
distance between clause initiations. 
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The temporal distance between initiation of a clause and the 
initiation of the f ollowing clause was measured f or each 
clause . Complement clauses were not included in the count 
although if a main clause was f ollowed by a complement 
clause, it was that distance that was measured. As stated 
earlier, inchoative verbs f ollowed by the present participle 
were counted as progressives. Figure 17  below demonstrates 
the measuring process with respect to clause types: 
i:== •.31., 
t L85 �r 
12.80 s 
·1 ► 
and walks over, Pulls out and starts He chops 
towards the some wood, chopping at at the 
woodpile. i t. wood. 
NON-PROG NON-PROG PROG NON-PROG 
r 
11.14 ,...s 
---4►�r-- ,.1 ► 
He's 
chopping, 
with the hoe, 
at the soil 
PROG 
FIGURE 1 7 .  
He turns the woman 
to hear, address him. 
NON-PROG NON-PROG 
Measurement of temporal distance between 
initiations of dif ferent types of c lauses . 
5 .2 . 3.Results 
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Tables 4 -8 and Figures 18�22 summariz e the results. As can be 
seen clearly with all but one subj ect ( S ubj ect 3 ' s sample of 
progressives was too small to be of significance) , 
progressives correlate with greater temporal distances 
between clause initiations while non-progressives c orrelate 
with smaller temporal distances between c lause initiations .  
TABLE 4 .  S ubj ec t  1 :  Temporal Distance Between Clause 













Tim e T: 
Less than 2 secs 
Less than 4 secs 
Less than 6 secs 
Less than 8 secs 
Less than 1 O secs 




34 1 3  
44 1 2  
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O punctuals 
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56 1 5  
88 1 4  
91 1 0  





' "  
------- progressives 
....... � -" ------... -- - punctuals 
. . 
6 6  
0 < 2  < 4  < 6  < 8  < 1 0  >=1 0 
FIGURE 18. 
Temporal distance between c lause init iations 
(Seconds) 
S ubj ec t  1 :  % punctuals/ progressives vs . 
temporal distance  between c lause initiations. 
Chi-square analysis p = . 04 1 6 .  
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In Figure 18, the bold lines represent lines of best fit and 
demonstrate that as the temporal distance between clause 
initiations becomes greater, progressive encoding increases. 
In Figure 19 below, we see the same relationship although the 
point at which progressives and punctuals are equal (the 50%-
50% cross-over point of the bold lines) occurs at a much 
higher temporal distance than that for subject 1. This may be 
due to one subject (Subject 2) waiting longer than subject 1 
to determine whether or not an EVENT conceptualization could 
be made. The speakers may also have relied on their memory of 
the first practise viewing in different ways. Subject 2 may 
have had a better recollection of when EVENT boundaries 
occurred and therefore waited longer for them before 
linguistically encoding the model. We find an even more 
pronounced "waiting" in Subject 3 (Figure 20) below where the 
speaker chooses to use progressives only for those models 
that continue for longer than twelve seconds. For all others, 
the speaker used only punctuals. 














Subj ect 2 :  Temporal Distance Between Clause 
I nitiations Versus Percentage of Punctual Versus 
Progress ive Encoding 
Tim e T: 
Less than 2 secs 
Less than 4 secs 
Less than 6 secs 
Less than 8 secs 
Less than 1 0 secs 
More than 1 0 secs 
Totals: 
0 punctuals 


















1 00 3 
23 26 
□ progressives 
< 1 0  >=1 0 




FIGURE 19. S ubj ect 2 :  % punctuals/progressives vs . 
temporal distance between clause initiations. 
Chi-square analysis p = . 0 0 08.  
TABLE 6 .  S ubj ect 3 :  Temporal Distance Between Clause 
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Less than 2 secs 
Less than 4 secs 
Less than 6 secs 
Less than 8 secs 
Less than 1 0 secs 
More than 1 0  secs 
Totals :  
0 punctuals 





1 00 6 
1 00 5 
1 00 3 
33 1 
94 79 
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FIGURE 2 0 . S ubj ect 3 :  % punctuals/progressives vs. 
temporal distance between clause initiations . 
Chi-square analysis insignif icant due to small 
sample of progressives . 
TABLE 7 . Subj ect 4 :  Temporal Distance Between Clause 
I nitiations Versus Percentage of Punctual Versus 














Tim e T: 
Less than 2 secs 
Less than 4 secs 
Less than 6 secs 
Less than 8 secs 
Less than 1 0 secs 
More than 1 o secs 
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1 00 1 
38 45 
0 punctuals □ progressives 
< 2  
progressiyes 
punctuals 
< 4  < 6  < 8  < 1 0 
Temporal distance between clause initiations 
(Seconds) 
>=1 0 
7 0  
FIGURE 2 1 .  Subj ect 4 :  % punctuals/progressives vs. 
temporal distance  between clause initiations. 
Chi-square analysis p = .0 0 0 4 .  
TABLE 8. All S ubj ects : Temporal Distance Between Clause 
Initiations Versus Percentage of Punctual Versus 











1 0  
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Tim e T: 
Less than 2 secs 
Less than 4 secs 
Less than 6 secs 
Less than 8 secs 
Less than 1 0  secs 
More than 1 0  secs 
Totals: 
0 punctuals 
< 2  < 4  
Punctual 
Percentage N 
76 1 32 
67 92 
49 26 
3 1  8 
46 6 
1 4  1 
65 265 






69 1 8  
54 7 
86 6 
35 1 45 
□ progressives 
< 1 0  >=1 0 
Tem poral distance between clause initiations 
(Seconds) 
7 1  
FIGURE 2 2 .  All subj ects : % punctuals/progressives vs . 
temporal distance between clause initiations. 
Chi-square analysis p = 0 . 0 0 01. 
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Note especially the very strong association of Table 8. Chi 
square analysis yielded over a 99% probability that the 
relationship between temporal distance between clause 
initiations and use of progressive aspect is not due to 
chance. The greater distance is due to the speaker's 
inability to predict or determine the terminal boundary of an 
existing neural model. Short-lived models allow the speaker 
to easily access both initial and terminal boundaries giving 
rise to punctuals. Durative models reduce the speaker's 
ability to predict or access the terminal boundary thereby 
giving rise to progressives. 
5. 3 Experimental Analysis: The Causal Relation 
Between Parameter Access and Aspect 
5. 3. 1 Hypothesis 
The previous analysis demonstrated that greater model 
duration, as reflected by temporal distance between clauses, 
was associated with greater use of the progressive. The 
longer duration reduced the speaker's access to the model's 
terminal boundary. Another method of reducing access to 
initial and terminal boundaries is to limit access to 
parameters (as defined in section 3. 2. 3) involved in EVENTS. 
This requires an online task to prevent the speaker from 
using a memorial representation and to allow us a better 
determination of the mental representation's nature at any 
particular time. We can thus infer what parameters are 
available and the habituated/dishabituated state of the 
neural model in activated memory . The neural model that I 
have been representing with a single bar representation is 
actually made up of many different "sub-models" - each sub­
model belonging to a certain parameter (Figure 23) .  
Release 
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FIGURE 23. Overall neural model made up of sub-models. 
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If we imagine a speaker watching the boy, the ball and the 
window scenario, the probability of predicting a model 
discrepancy (for example, at A, the window being hit) 
decreases if the parameters involved in the discrepancy are 
not available until the discrepancy actually occurs. If the 
speaker is able to predict the discrepancy, he is more likely 
to form EVENT conceptualizations because he has access to 
both initial and terminal boundaries. On the basis of this, 
we make the following hypothesis : 
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( 8) Situation A :  the speaker has access to a parameter 
or parameters involved in an upcoming model 
discrepancy before the discrepancy occurs. 
Situation B :  the speaker has access to a parameter 
or parameters involved in a model discrepancy 
only at the time the discrepancy occurs. 
Given situation A and B above, a speaker will use 
more punctuals and fewer progressives in 
situation A than situation B. In situation B, 
the opposite is true. 
5 . 3 . 2 Method 
The experiment design employs two sets of animations, 
both animating exactly the same activity. The difference 
between the two sets is in how many of the parameters are 
available to the speaker at particular points in time during 
the animation. In one condition, the WIDE condition, speakers 
are able to see all parameters that will be involved in 
models and their dishabituations at all points in time during 
the animation. In the second condition, the NARROW condition, 
a "zoom window" is placed over the animations of the first 
condition to limit the speaker ' s  access to the parameters. 
The speaker has access to these parameters just a short time 
before they are involved in a major change in the animation. 
For example, in the animation below, a man walks from his 
trailer to a restaurant and then walks in. In the NARROW 
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condition ( Figure 2 5 ) ,  a zoom spotlight follows the man from 
the trailer to the restaurant . The restaurant is not seen by 
the speaker until he is very close to it . The WIDE condition 
( Figure 2 4 ) allows the subject to access all involved 
parameters . 
--•----------i-
FIGURE 2 4 . WIDE condition in "Restaurant " film.  
7 6  
FIGURE 2 5. NARROW condition in "Restaurant" film.  
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The animations that were used included various activities. As 
we will see in the results section, certain types of films 
were better suited to produce the progressive/non-progressive 
distinction using this type of manipulation. Possible reasons 
for this will be explained in section 5. 3. 3. 2. The following 
is a list of the animations and their basic "story" content. 
(9) List of Animations2 
a. Lady in car: a woman in a red car is driving 
from the right hand side of the screen to the 
left and passes a tree and fire hydrant. 
b. Statue: a man runs up to a ball and kicks it 
over a statue. 
c. Airplane: an airplane circles the Statue of 
Liberty and flies through some clouds. 
d. Fish: a big fish swims towards a stationary 
little fish and eats it. 
e. Bicyclist: a man on a bicycle rides past a dog 
and a mailbox. He stops at a red light and then 
goes off the screen on the green light. 
f. Donkey: a man walks up to a branch, picks it up 
and walks towards a donkey and hits it with the 
branch. 
g. Ball in window: a man picks up a ball and throws 
it at a window and breaks the window. 
h. Dog: a dog runs and walks by different objects 
such as a garbage can, a fence, a table and many 
others. 
i. Boulder: a dog at the top of a hill nudges a 
boulder with his nose. The boulder rolls down a 
hill and hits a bush where a cat is lying down. 
The cat gets up and leaves. 
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j. Triangle: a triangle different directions among 
other objects (circles, squares and stars) on 
the screen. 
k. Restaurant: a car drives by and then a man gets 
out of his trailer and walks to a restaurant. He 
enters the restaurant. Another car drives by. 
The man comes out of the restaurant with a bag 
in his hand and walks back to his trailer. 
These animations were shown to two groups of fifteen subjects 
each. Group A watched one set of the above animations 
randomly chosen for order and the WIDE-NARROW condition (e. g. 
animation A. WIDE, B. NARROW, C. NARROW, D. WIDE) . These were 
followed by the same set and order of animations but in the 
opposite condition as the first set. Group B watched the same 
animations as group A, in exactly the same order but the 
NARROW-WIDE conditions were opposite. 
(10) Example animation sets for groups A and B 
Group A Group B 
la. Woman in car. WIDE 
2a. Soccer kick. NARROW 
3a. Airplane. NARROW 
4a. Fish. NARROW 
la. Woman in car. NARROW 
2a. Soccer kick. WIDE 
3a. Airplane. WIDE 
4a. Fish. WIDE 
Sa. Biker. WIDE Sa. Biker. NARROW 
lla. Trailer man. NARROW lla. Trailer man.WIDE 
lb. Woman in car. NARROW lb. 
2b. Soccer kick. WIDE 2b. 
3b. Airplane. WIDE 3b. 
4b. Fish. WIDE 4b. 
Sb. Biker. NARROW Sb. 
Woman in car. WIDE 




lla. Trailer man. WIDE lla. Trailer man. NARROW 
Subjects were instructed as follows: 
(11) I am going to show you a series of short 
animations on the computer screen in front of 
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you. What I would like you to do is describe to 
me what you see on the screen as the action 
unfolds. In other words, describe what you see 
while simultaneously watching the animation. 
In some of the animations, you will see a zoom 
window, or a spotlight. Do not describe the 
window or spotlight itself but what only what is 
inside it. 
You will see each film twice3 • While watching it 
the second time, be sure to tell me only what's 
on the screen as you describe it. In other 
words, although you already know what's going to 
happen from the first viewing, do not go ahead 
of what's on the screen. 
Any questions? 
Try to keep up with the film as best you can. 
The discourse produced by each of the speakers was tape­
recorded and then transcribed. As with the analyses in 
sections 5.1 and 5. 2, all verb forms with "-ing" were counted 
as progressive (including true progressives, inchoatives + 
gerund -ing, relative and complement clauses with -ing 
verbs) . In the "Chicken Story" of sections 5.1 and 5 . 2, the 
number of characters (two main characters) and scenes (three 
major scenes) were limited. In these animations, there are 
more than eleven different scenes and each animation has a 
different character set. For this reason, many existentials 
and statives appeared. These were counted separately from the 
progressives and simple punctual forms of the verb. 
Infinitive complements were also counted. 
5. 3. 3 Results 
5. 3. 3. 1  Significant Differences Between Progressive and 
Punctual 
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The experiment was designed to produce differences 
between progressive and simple punctual forms. Typical 
subject descriptions demonstrating these differences is given 
in the appendix. In the following analysis, the percentage of 
progressives was taken from the total of progressives and 
simple punctual forms (in other words, this percentage is NOT 
based on the total sample of clauses including existentials, 
statives and infinitive complements) . Analysis of variance 
was used to determine whether or not the difference between 
the mean progressive percentages of the narrow and wide 
conditions is significant or not. 
Figure 26 below verifies the prediction: limited access 
to parameters (the NARROW view) produces more progressives 
than the WIDE view in which the speaker has access to all 
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Mean percent progressive encoding of narrow 
and wide views across all subjects and all 
f ilms . 
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Although the difference is only 10%, the ANOVA analysis4 shows 
the difference as significant with a probability greater than 
95%. 
In carrying out the ANOVA analysis for each specific 
film, the results appear much more conflicting - and 
interesting. The analysis for each film is presented below in 
Figures 27 and 28. They have been arranged according to the 
differences in the mean progressive percentages between 
narrow and wide conditions. The differences decrease as one 
moves to the right . As one can see, the "Restaurant" and 
"Dog" film account for the significant difference across all 
films. The "Airplane," "Triangle, " "Donkey, " "Bicyclist" and 
"Boulder" films have means that correspond to the prediction 
(greater progressive use in the narrow condition) but the 
difference between the means is insignificant (p > 0 .05) . The 
"Statue, " "Lady in car," "Ball in window" and "Fish" films 
demonstrate differences that contradict the prediction, 
although these differences are insignificant. 
100 Difference of 51 .6% 
F-test = 42.91 Difference 
p=0.0001 of 38.8% 88.6% Narrow view 90 F-test = 23.28 
p=0.0001 Wide view 80.2 
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A comparison of mean progres sive use in narrow versus 
wide condition across the films that demonstrate greater 
use of  progressive in the wide condition . .  
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At first glance, it might appear that the experiment was a 
failure. After all, only 2 of the eleven films significantly 
demonstrate the expected results. However, the analysis below 
examines the differences between the films and demonstrates 
that the apparent failure of the hypothesis is due to film 
design. 
5 .3. 3. 2 Examination of Experimental Design in Light of 
Results 
As shown in Table 9, subjects used more clauses in 
describing the "Restaurant" and "Dog" film than the other 
films. Any sample size less than 5-6 clauses per film does 
not produce a significant difference between narrow and wide 
views. The length of the film might therefore affect clause 
encoding. Upon viewing a new film, the subject attempts to 
"set the scene" using existentials and statives. Often these 
existentials are accompanied by progressive relative clauses 
("There ' s  a man riding a bike"; "There's a fish swimming 
above some rocks. ") If the film is of short duration, the 
speaker can do little more than set the scene. A high 
percentage of existential and stative encoding results. For 
example, the "Statue, " "Lady in car" and "Fish" films are all 
encoded with an average of 2 to 4 clauses, with at least 30%  
of those clauses being a stative or existential. The speaker 
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is not able to form EVENT conceptualizations that span any 
period of time . Few non-progressive punctuals are the result . 
I f  the film is of longer duration , the speaker is able to set 
the scene and then attend to the changes taking place over 
time within the scene . 
TABLE 9 .  Average Number of Clauses and Average Percentage of 
Statives and Existentials Used for Each Film Across 
All Subjects 
FILM TITLE Average number of Average percentage 
( arranged from most clauses ( all types ) of statives and 
in line with the used to describe existentials used 
hypothesis to the film to describe film 
least ) 
Restaurant 7 . 9  12 % 
Dog 19 . 5  6%  
Airplane 3 . 1 21% 
Triangle 3 . 8  2 7 %  
Donkey 4 . 8  16% 
Bicyclist 5 . 8  17 % 
Boulder 4 . 7 1 6%  
Statue 2 . 0 3 2%  
Lady in  car 3 . 3  3 9%  
Ball in window 3 . 7  10%  
Fish 2 . 9  3 1% 
In retrospect , the specific actions of each film also  
contributed to its success  or  failure as  a 
progres sive /punctual eliciting film . During the recording of 
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each subject's production, the initiation and end of 
different actions were indicated by beeps inaudible to the 
speaker . These were recorded on the left track of the tape5 • 
Each beep represented a major change in the animation stimuli 
( changes in direction of objects, passing another object, 
hitting an object, etc . ) .  The "Restaurant" film has 16 such 
beeps while the dog film has 30 . The remaining films have 
only 5 to 7 beeps each . Here again, we see that those films 
with less action produce less distinction between progressive 
and punctual forms . In addition, the actions of the 
"Restaurant" and "Dog" films have the greatest degree of 
change . For example, in the "Lady in car" and "Bicyclist" 
films, a car driver and bike rider move from right to left 
in/on their vehicle, passing various objects . There are no 
changes in direction and very little change of speed . The 
degree of dishabituation is likely minimal . In contrast, in 
the "Restaurant" film, a man comes out of his trailer, turns 
a full ninety degrees and walks towards another building. He 
turns another ninety degrees again and enters the building -
disappearing from view . These changes in direction and 
disappearances/reappearances likely cause greater 
dishabituation of the orienting response and hence sharper, 
more distinct EVENT boundaries . The "Restaurant"/"Dog" films 
demonstrate the greatest progressive/punctual distinction 
between the WIDE and NARROW condition simply because they 
provide the speaker opportunity to make such a distinction. 
The other films do not. 
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One other issue to consider in looking at the unexpected 
results of the experiment, is the effect of lexical aspect 
over grammatical/periphrastic aspect. For example in the 
"Ball in window" film, the ball breaks the window. This 
change was encoded by most speakers using a verb referring to 
a very specific point in time - i. e. "break" - a verb 
encoding the change over only one dishabituation. It is 
conceivably difficult to elicit these verbs as progressives. 
Other examples are "hit" as in the "Donkey" film - "The boy 
hits the donkey" and "stop" as in the "Bicyclist" film - "He 
stops at the light. " I considered not including these types 
of verbs in the sample, but it was difficult to determine an 
objective means of establishing which verbs would be granted 
such status. In addition, a few speakers, did use the 
progressive "breaking the window," "He's hitting the donkey, " 
"He's stopping at the light. " Presently, it appears that the 
design of the films does not normally elicit progressive 
aspect with these highly punctual verbs. 
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Notes 
1. This film was produced by T. Giv6n in consultation with 
two New Guinea anthropologists. The film presents the story 
of a man who goes to chop wood with an axe. A woman appears 
on the scene and talks to the man. Afterwards, she goes to 
prepare a meal by a fire. The meal preparation consists of 
going to get water, lighting the fire, getting a chicken and 
attempting to butcher it. She ends up putting together an 
adhoc meal. When she presents the meal to the man, he is 
disgusted and chases the woman. 
2. The following animations were produced using graphics from 
a number of sources: MacroMind, Inc. ; Russ Tomlin's Fish 
film; and my own artwork. 
3.  My original intent was to compare the WIDE-NARROW 
condition within subjects. However, because the second set of 
films is the same as the first, memorial representations are 
utilized and the WIDE-NARROW distinction is lost. For the 
purposes of this research, I compare only the first viewings 
of Group A with the first viewings of Group B. 
4. The ANOVA analysis compares the variance between subjects 
and calculates the means of the two conditions. If the means 
are different but the variance among subjects is great, then 
the relationship proves less significant. If the means are 
different but the variance is small, the difference proves to 
be more significant. 
5. These beeps are meant for future use in determining the 
timing interaction of speech utterance initiation with change 
in stimulus. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER COGNITIVE RECASTING OF 
EXISTING IDEAS 
6. 1 Significance of Both Positive and 
"Negative " Results 
9 0  
The results of the previous section demonstrate that the 
aspectual predictions of the information processing model 
hold true. The production from the postview task produces 
less progressives and more punctuals than online production. 
This difference is attributed to the speaker's use of his 
memorial representation. This allows greater access to 
dishabituations, or model changes, that act as boundaries for 
EVENTS. The limited access to such boundaries in online 
production causes the speaker to use more progressives, 
encoding the PROCESS conceptualizations at particular points 
in time. 
The text-based measurement of temporal distance between 
clause initiations demonstrated that when a speaker was not 
able to predict the terminal boundary of a model due to its 
durativity, PROCESS conceptualization occurs and progressive 
encoding results. Short duration models allow the speaker 
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access to both initial and terminal boundaries, resulting in 
the punctual forms associated with EVENT conceptualizations. 
The stimulus-based experiment demonstrated that a view 
which limits access to parameters involved in future 
dishabituations hampers speakers' predictions of EVENT 
endpoints. This results in PROCESS conceptualizations and 
hence progressive forms. Not all of the films in the 
experiment demonstrated data consistent with this prediction. 
The above listed reasons - small sample size, short film 
duration, and type of animated event - are as yet unproven 
explanations which account for the inconsistencies. 
These hypotheses and the inconsistencies themselves 
provide insight to a number of aspectually related issues. 
The results that do verify the predictions provide the basis 
for cognitively recasting a number of existing ideas 
concerning progressive aspect and aspect in general. 
6.1. 1. Parameter Establishment - Reference 
to Models 
As stated earlier, the shorter films may not have 
provided the speaker time to deal with much more than setting 
the scene. Interestingly enough, setting the scene in the 
films was often done with progressive verbs preceded by an 
indefinite noun phrase or with an existential clause followed 
by a progressive relative clause. 
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(11) a. A man is picking up the ball. 
b. There's a man picking up a ball. 
Of all the first utterances produced by all subjects 
describing the films, 33. 5% were of type (lla) . Another 33. 5%  
were of type (llb) . Thus, sixty-six percent of all first 
utterances begin with a progressive or existential + 
progressive construction. Less than 15% began with a clause 
consisting of a simple punctual verb. According to Tomlin 
(1987, 1991) , global shifts in attention, referred to as 
episode boundaries, produce full noun phrases rather than 
pronomial reference - a reflection of the resetting of the 
mental representation. These nominals often occur in 
existentials when indefinite. In new episodes (new films in 
this case) , a speaker uses these forms to help the listener 
"set the scene" in his mental representation. With the films 
used above, the speaker first attempts to "set the scene" of 
the film being viewed by referring to the neural models in 
his mental representation. Thus, the speaker makes reference 
to the parameters ("the stable conceptual units" - the 
referential entities of the film) of the model and, as shown 
by the progressive forms, the PROCESS conceptualization of 
the neural models. The speaker essentially tries to help the 
hearer relegate new information to a predictable state as 
quickly as possible. 
6. 1. 2 Lexical Aspect: A Cognitive Recast of 
Vendler and Dowty 
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As explained in section 5.3,  some of the films may not 
have elicited the progressive/punctual distinction simply 
because the form used encodes a truly punctual EVENT - i. e. 
an EVENT which caused a change between two models over a very 
small duration of time. Verbs such as "shatter," "snap," 
"break, " etc. are typical examples. The EVENT spans only one 
dishabituation and this short span is inherently coded in the 
lexical item. Vendler (1967) classified verbs according to 
their lexical aspect and provided tests for each of his four 
classes. Dowty (1979) provides more criteria for each of 
these classes in addition to providing further tests of class 
membership. Although the above research deals primarily with 
grammatical aspect as coded in the progressive, the general 
information processing theory behind it can also be used to 
explain and define the lexical aspectual distinctions of 
Vendler and Dowty. 
Only verbs of two classes can occur in the progressive 
according to Vendler: ACTIVITIES and ACCOMPLISHMENTS. 
ACTIVITIES are processes that occur through time "in a 
homogeneous way; any part of the process is of the same 
nature as the whole" (1967: 101) . Thus "to run around" is an 
ACTIVITY. At any time of the ACTIVITY, "running around" is 
occurring. ACCOMPLISHMENTS "also go on in time, but they 
proceed towards a terminus which is logically necessary to 
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their being what they are" ( p . 10 1) . Thus "to run a mile" is  
an ACCOMPLISHMENT . The running of the mile proceeds through 
time and is only accomplished once the terminus ( a  distance 
of one mile) is reached ( Holisky, 198 1) . ACHIEVEMENTS embody 
either the initiation or the termination of an act and 
include verbs such as "recognize, "  "find, " "win, " "start, " 
and "stop . "  STATES "cannot be qualified as actions at all" 
( Vendler, 1967: 10 6 ) . They involve no dynamics but rather are 
a result of change or existent regardless of change 
( Mourelatos, 198 1) . Verbs such as "have, " "know, " "desire, " 
and "love" belong to this class . STATES usually do not take 
progressive form ( *"I am knowing the answer", *"I am having a 
car", *"I am loving my wife") . This diagnostic is not 
definitive however, in that certain contexts may allow STATE 
verbs to take the progressive form ( see section 6 . 4) .  The 
classification of ACHIEVEMENTS, ACTIVITIES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
AND STATES is binary as represented in Figure 29 below . 
states 















Lexical aspect according to  Vendler ( 1 9 6 7 ) and 
Dowty ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 
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Figure 29 can be cognitively recast in terms of 
dishabituations and neural models , as in Figure 30. Lexical 
items belonging to the ACHIEVEMENT aspectual class (punctual 
occurrences , such as the previously mentioned "shatter , "  
"snap , "  "break , "  etc. ) encode the change that occurs across 
one dishabituation - a very short span of time. Thus , those 
films with EVENTS that could be labelled with ACHIEVEMENT 
class verbs inhibited any alternative progressive encoding. 
ACHIEVEMENTS can also be the culmination of a PROCESS. For 
example: "He was searching for the money when suddenly he 
found it. " The first clause encodes the PROCESS model of 
"searching" while the second clause encodes the change - the 
single dishabituation - from "lost and searching" to "found 
and no longer searching." ACCOMPLISHMENT lexical items encode 
the EVENT conceptualization bounded by two different 
dishabituations , with the terminal dishabituation being a 
change of a specified type. The ACCOMPLISHMENT takes time , as 
indicated by the existence of a neural model between the 
dishabituations. The ACCOMPLISHMENT does not actually occur 
until the goal of the neural model , the change in state of 
the present model to the new model , occurs. ACTIVITIES are 
very similar to accomplishments except that the terminal 
dishabituation is not of a specific type. STATES are the 
equivalent of the cognitive model STATES. Figure 30 
summarizes the differences between these conceptualizations. 










change across two or 
more dishabituations 
temporal location of 














change across two or more 
dishabituations 
terminus is definite 




(ac hleve ments) 
change across only one 
dishabi tua.tion 
• ii 




9 8  
6.1 . 3  Complementation and Aspect 
This cognitive recast of lexical aspect also reveals the 
cognitive underpinnings of participial complementation found 
in English. As stated earlier, the progressive form of 
English encodes the state of a temporary neural model at any 
particular point in time. Models can also be encoded with 
respect to the dishabituations that mark the beginning or end 
of the model - similar to the ACCOMPLISHMENT aspect class 
discussed above. This often occurs in complement 
constructions in which the main verb encodes the 
dishabituation and the complement verb encodes the model. For 
example, inceptive verbs such as "begin, " "start, " and 
"initiate" often take participial complements. These 
participial complements encode the model following the 
dishabituation which initiated the model. Likewise, verbs 
such as "finish, " "quit, " "terminate, " and "stop" are often 
followed by participial complements that encode the model 
preceding the terminal dishabituation. Figure 31 demonstrates 
the relationship that exists between these types of verbal 
constructions and neural models. 
a. Progressive encoding of the model at a particular point in time during the model. 
"He's picking 
up wood." 
b. Participial complement preceded by inceptive main clause verb encoding 
both the dishabituation and the following model 
Bf,Rr-� . .  :·: �.:/J'l.i·' 
�r---. -·r.  ..... 't 
"He starts picking 
up wood." 
c. Participial complement preceded by terminative main clause verb encoding 
both the dishabituation and the preceding model 
"He stops 
picking up the 
wood." 
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FIGURE 31. A cognitive recast of English complementation. 
This analysis suggests that the very form of the English 
progressive behaves very similarly to a participial 
complement, using the copula "to be" as the main verb. Rather 
than encoding an accompanying EVENT, the copula indicates 
that what is encoded is the state of a neural model at a 
particular point in time. The following cognitive recast of 
Comrie's aspectual distinctions provides further motivation 
for this "hybrid" analysis of the progressive. 
6. 2 A Cognitive Recast of Comrie's Aspectual 
Distinctions ( 197 6 )  
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Aspect, according to Comrie (1976),  refers to the 
internal temporal constituency of a situation. Perfective 
aspect "indicates the view of the situation as a single 
whole, . . .  while the imperfective pays essential attention to 
the internal structure of the situation" (p. 16) . The 
imperfective can be further subclassified into habitual and 
continuous varieties. Habituals describe a situation 
characteristic of an extended period of time. Continuous 
forms can be subdivided into progressive and nonprogressive 
classes. Progressiveness is defined as continuousness not 
occasioned by habituality. These subdivisions are shown in 
Figure 32. 
These same subdivisions can be recast in the cognitive 
terms of dishabituation and habituated models (Figure 33) . 
Perfective 
FIGURE 32 . 
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F IGURE 33 . A cognitive reanalysis of Comrie ' s  ( 1 9 6 7 ) aspectual c lassification 
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The shaded boxes on the bottom of the figure indicate the 
different forms used in different languages to encode the 
conceptualizations found above. Starting from the left side 
of the diagram, we see that EVENT conceptualizations are 
encoded by perfective forms. Moving rightward, note that 
habitual conceptualizations may be based on the changes 
between models or a model itself. In English, habituals are 
encoded using the perfective or periphrastic form : 
( 12 ) a .  
b .  
He works (every day) . 
He used to work ( everyday) . 
In some languages with an imperfective form, such as 
Bulgarian ( Comrie, 197 6 : 31) , the imperfect is used in 
conjunction with the perfect to form a habitual. Other 
languages, such as some of the Celtic languages ( Comrie, 
197 6 : 3 9) use the imperfective/progressive form to code both 
habituality ( "He goes.") , and process ( "He is going.") . We 
can understand why both the perfective and imperfective forms 
are used cross-linguistically to encode habituality by 
examining the types of models habitual concepts are encoding. 
Habitual concepts involve the same EVENT repeated over and 
over for an extended period of time. The speaker may either 
refer to the EVENT occurring over and over again or relegate 
such repetition to a PROCESS model of repeated EVENTS ( Figure 
34 below) . 
Conceptual structure of habitual EVENTS 
.- f.a-f.#IJ.-f.#11.-f.m .. f.a .. f.af.#IJ.-f.a.a .. f.�., 
PROCESS model formed from repetitive and predictable series of EVENTS 
FIGURE 34. Possible habitual conceptualizations. 
Thus, we can see why, cross-linguistically, either the 
PROCESS or EVENT forms might be used to encode habituality. 
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Moving to the right of the figure, encoding of temporary 
PROCESS models is accomplished by using a specifically 
Imperfective/Progressive form or as found in English, a 
hybrid STATIVE-PERFECTIVE form (denoted by the overlapped 
cross-hatched region) . This "hybrid" is discussed below. On 
the far right of the diagram, we find statives encoding 
STATIVE conceptualizations based on relatively time-stable 
models. 
6. 3 Relationships of Analogy Between 
Progressive and Stative 
The hybrid form of the English progressive demonstrates 
its "medial" PROCESS relationship to EVENTS and STATES. That 
is the progressive form is composed of a form related to that 
used to encode STATES and a form related to that used to 
encode EVENTS. PROCESSES and STATES are both 
conceptualizations of habituated models. In English, STATES 
are usually encoded with a fully inflected form of the 
stative verb "to be" along with a nominal or adjectival 
predicate: 
( 13) She is tall . 
The ball is red. 
He was a good worker. 
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PROCESSES are grammatically encoded using the progressive. 
There is evidence that the English progressive is 
diachronically derived from a predicate locative construction 
in which the nominalized form of the EVENT verb is used as 
the location . The stative predicate locative construction of 
( 14a) becomes more event-like in the reduced and now 
progressive form of ( 14b) . In ( 15 a, b) we find a similar 
process occurring except that the predicate adjective of 
( 15 b) has retained vestiges of the prepositional locative. 
( 14) a. He is at working. 
b. He is working. 
( 15 )  a. He is at sleeping. 
b. He is asleep. 
S ynchronically, the English progressive uses the verb "to be" 
in its fully inflected form while the verb denoting the 
process is in a participial form: 
( 16)  He ' s  picking up the hatchet. 
He's carrying wood. 
She's lighting the fire. 
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The PROCESS verb is derived from an EVENT verb that has lost 
its agreement with the subject and any finite tense-aspect­
modality marking. It is much more "model-like" or 
adjectival/nominal in form and is often found operating in 
these domains. 
( 17) Nominal: "Walking is good for the heart. " 
Adjectival: "The running water spilled out. " 
Predicate adjective: "The man was sitting. " 
Thus the progressive form reflects its the encoding of 
conceptual structure caught in between STATIVE and EVENT. The 
use of the copula indicates that a model is being encoded (as 
it does with STATIVES) . The participial/nominal form ("He is 
picking up the wood. ") of what would normally be an EVENT 
encoding ("He picks up the wood") reflects that the speaker 
is not encoding the change but the model of activity and that 
this model is temporary. The EVENT form has undergone 
nominalization or more specifically "modelization" where the 
derived form encodes a model rather than a change. 
6. 4 A Cognitive Look at Progressive Statives 
Vendler (1967) states that lexically STATIVE verbs 
cannot be found in progressive form. In general, this is 
true. Speakers do not normally say "I am knowing the answer" 
or "I am believing the government" - however, these sentences 
are not impossibilities. Indeed, given a suitable context, 
they make perfect sense. 
(18) a. "I am knowing the answer more and more during 
class. " 
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b. "I am believing the government these days, but 
who knows what tomorrow will bring?" 
Verbs associated with experience also are rarely found in 
progressive form, but may be permissible given certain 
contexts. 
(19) a. *"I am seeing Kim. " cf. "I see Kim. " 
b. "I am seeing Kim but I'm not sure - perhaps its 
an illusion." 
The contexts of (18a, b) and (19b) that allow the progressive 
share one characteristic - temporary states or experience. As 
stated earlier, the English progressive is used to encode 
those neural models that are believed by the speaker to be 
temporary. Here we see that it is precisely that condition 
that allows the progressive to be used with verbs that are 
not normally associated with PROCESS conceptualizations. 
6. 5 Conclusion 
This research has demonstrated that progressive-punctual 
aspect distinctions in English can be explained cognitively. 
The cognitive information processing model presented here, 
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utilizes the dishabituation of the orienting response to 
chunk information. These information chunks can be approached 
from EVENT, PROCESS or STATE perspectives. The formation of 
EVENT conceptualizations requires that the speaker have 
access to both initial and terminal boundaries, or 
dishabituations of an EVENT. PROCESS conceptualizations are 
based on the state of habituated neural models, believed to 
be temporary by the speaker. STATE conceptualizations are 
also based on the state of habituated neural models, however 
these models are believed to be time-stable. 
This research provided empirical testing of the model 
using an online production paradigm. The results demonstrated 
that by limiting access to stimuli involved in EVENTS, 
PROCESS conceptualization occurs and progressive encoding 
results. The results and subsequent analysis indicated a 
number of film design parameters that should be implemented 
in future research of this sort. 
Finally, this research has shown that traditional ideas 
of grammatical and lexical aspect can be cognitively recast. 
This recasting has provided further insight into the mental 
representations behind aspect and the form-function 
relationships governing the encoding of those 
representations. 
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APPENDIX 
SAMPLE DATA OF A CONDITION A SUBJECT AND A 
CONDITION B SUBJECT 
The f ollowing are examples of data typically given by  
subj ects in describing each of the films f or the f irst  time. 
Condition A 
Narrow 
There ' s  a red c ar 
driving left 
and there ' s  a woman 
sitting inside. 
She j ust past a yellow f ire 
hydrant. 
Now it ' s  gone. 
Narrow 
There ' s  a little kid 
kicking a ball 
and it went over a statue of 
a man . 
Narrow 
There ' s  a red airplane 
f lying f urther . .. closer. 
Condition B 
Wide 
There ' s  a car 
driving by a tree and by a 
fire hydrant 
Wide 
And there ' s  a person 
kicking a ball over a statue 
Wide 
And a plane j ust f lew by a, 
statue of liberty a nd through 
the clouds 
Condition A continued 
Wide 
There ' s  a person on  a bike 
j ust  passed a dog and then a 
letter box 
and stopped f or a red light. 
And he proceeded 
to go after the light turned 
green. 
Wide 
The child came up 
and picked up a stick . 
And hit a donkey 
who tried to kic k  him .  
Wide 
There ' s a person 
picked up a ball or a rock 
threw it at a window 
and the roc k  went thru the 
window into the house . 
Narrow 
There ' s  a dog 
running or j umping 
another dog walking in a 
house 
another dog j umping and 
running 
another dog walking near a 
brick wall 
another dog walking 
walked around a chair 
another dog running and 
j umping 
another dog walking by a box 
another dog running by a tire 
j umped over a table 
now he ' s  running and j umping 
and he stopped. 
Wide 
There ' s  a c ute dog 
j ust knocked a rock down a 
hill 
and hit a bush 
and scared a cat away. 
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Condition B c ontinued 
Narrow 
And a bicycle guy j ust drove 
by a a dog and a post of f ice  
box 
and stopped at a red light 
and it turned green 
he ' s  driving still . 
Narrow 
And a man is walking 
and picking up a ruu • .  stick 
and hitting an animal 
Narrow 
A guy is picking up a ball 
and throwing it through a 
window 
Wi de 
A dog just jumped over a 
stump 
and walked by a TV 
and a dog j ust ran by a 
garbage can 
walked around a brick wall 
the dog j ust walked by a 
chair 
and ran by a garbage can 
walked by an open box 
and ran by a tire 
and jumped on a table and off 
and by a stone wall and over 
a broken statue 
Narrow 
Little dog ' s s niffing around 
oh, pushed a rock down a hill 
and a cat came 
Condition A continued 
Narrow 
There ' s  a yellow triangle 
going up and down next to a 
blue circle 
now it moving to the right 
past a pink star 
and up past a pink circle 
Narrow 
There ' s a car 
driving really fast 
Person gets out of his little 
house 
He ' s  walking past a red 
building . 
Goes inside . 
And a blue car going lef t 
Man comes out of the house, 
building back to his old 
trailer 
1 1 1  
Condition B continued 
Wide 
A yellow triangle and a red 
triangle and blue circle 
went down by a star 
went by a purple dot 
Wide 
A car j ust drove by 
and a guy came out of the 
trailer 
he ' s  walking to a restaurant 
and a blue car drove by 
and a guy is corning back out 
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